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Abstract
We look at the consequences of allowing public health insurance (PuHI) to be voluntary
when its coverage can be supplemented in the market. PuHI redistributes with respect
to risk and income, and the market is affected by adverse selection. We argue that
making PuHI voluntary does not lead to its collapse since there are always individuals
participating in it. Additionally, in some cases, a voluntary PuHI scheme creates an
increase in market efficiency because participation in it becomes a sign of an individual’s
type. The welfare consequences depend on the status quo. If in the status quo there
is no political support for a compulsory PuHI, making it voluntary constitutes a Pareto
improvement, and in some cases all individuals are strictly better off. If, instead, the status
quo implements compulsory PuHI, making it voluntary then results in less redistribution.
JEL classification: H23, H42, H50, D72
Keywords: Public health insurance, adverse selection, majority voting
1 Introduction
Many health care systems rely on health insurance as a form of financing health care. Health
insurance may be public, if financed through general taxation and/or social security contribu-
tions, or private, if financed through private non-income related premiums. Therefore, most
often, public health insurance involves redistribution across income and risk levels, which is not
the case for private health insurance. Both types of insurance also diverge in terms of their
degree of obligation. Public health insurance is usually mandatory, whereas in most OECD
countries individuals may choose whether or not they want to insure privately, but the oppo-
site may exist as well. Additionally, some countries mandate the purchase of health insurance
irrespective of its nature, while others allow individuals to choose whether or not they wish to
be insured against health accidents.1
∗Toulouse School of Economics. 21, Alle´e de Brienne. 31015 Toulouse Cedex 6 FRANCE.
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1Since there exist many different health insurance schemes across countries and as many nomenclature, we
follow the taxonomy of health insurance types as proposed by OECD 2004.
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It is often claimed the unfeasibility of a voluntary yet redistributive PuHI scheme co-existing
with a voluntary private health insurance (PHI) market. If individuals were given the option to
opt out of PuHI, those contributing to its redistribution would leave and join the PHI market.
The result would be that no one would be willing to participate in public insurance.
Whilst in reality most PuHI schemes are indeed compulsory, there nevertheless exist some
examples of voluntary schemes, such as, for example, the Chilean reform of the 1980s, the
programs of some US states prior to the Affordable Care Act, and the schemes for the self-
employed in Europe. These cases of voluntary PuHI (discussed in more detail in Section 1)
naturally ask the question as to how their existence can be theoretically justified.
In this paper we explicitly analyze the coexistence of a voluntary and redistributive PuHI
scheme whose coverage can be supplemented by the market.2 As in many countries we assume
that PuHI pools risk and is financed by payroll taxes. Additionally, public coverage is decided
by majority voting. On the other hand, the PHI market is competitive, discriminates in risk
and is affected by adverse selection, thus offering incomplete coverage to low-risk individuals
(see Cawley and Philipson 1999, Cutler and Zeckhauser 1997, and Finkelstein and Poterba 2004
for empirical tests of adverse selection in health-related insurance markets). Adverse selection is
indeed an example often cited of market failure that a mandatory public scheme can overcome
(Arrow 1963, Johnson 1977). We instead focus on the implications of a voluntary PuHI scheme
for coverage available in both the public and private sectors.
Our paper arguably makes a number of important contributions to the relevant literature.
Firstly, we provide an analytical framework for the study of voluntary PuHI and show that its
existence is theoretically guaranteed since there are always individuals willing to participate
in it. Other authors have already looked at the interactions between the public and private
provision of health insurance, although they have always assumed a public mandatory scheme
(see Epple and Romano 1996, Gouveia 1997, Breyer 2001, and De Donder and Hindriks 2003).
Secondly, we realize that the change in nature of the public policy has implications not only
for itself but also for the private market. Golosov and Tsyvinski 2007 and Chetty and Saez 2010
show that the welfare gains of PuHI are smaller when markets respond endogenously, thereby
2Our analysis could easily be extended to other sorts of public insurance as insurance against income loss
due to disability or unemployment.
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stressing that markets should not be taken as given. Our contribution is in the same vein.
More precisely, we demonstrate that in some cases a voluntary PuHI scheme can increase the
efficiency of the PHI market. In this respect Sapelli and Vial 2003 find evidence of self-selection
against Chilean public insurance. However, what has not yet been asserted in the literature is
the market use of this information, implying an increase in private coverage when compared to
the exclusive PHI system.
Thirdly, we draw conclusions about the welfare implications of reforming PuHI into a volun-
tary scheme. In our setup, the status quo can be a society with either some level of compulsory
PuHI or no PuHI at all. In the former case, PHI market coverage is increased at the cost of
less redistribution. In the latter case there is room for a Pareto improvement: private coverage
may be increased to the benefit of more redistribution.
Finally, in our setup public coverage is decided by majority voting and thus we are able to
illustrate how the non-separability of preferences, with respect to public and private provision of
insurance, affects the political outcome. While this mechanism has already been noted for the
top-up of compulsory public insurance,3 we now present evidence for the top-up of voluntary
PuHI. The political consequence is that there is no opposition to voluntary public coverage.
This point has already been raised by Congleton 2007 who uses voluntarism to explain why
individuals with different insurance needs adopt, and politically support, states with different
PuHI schemes. In our setup, voluntarism allows individuals to signal their type and therefore
get a higher coverage in the market. Consequently, a voluntary PuHI scheme not only never
collapses but, furthermore, has stronger political support than a compulsory scheme.
Our paper is set out as follows. Section 1 describes two examples of voluntary PuHI schemes,
Section 2 introduces the setup, and in Section 3 we analyze the timing of decisions. We show, in
Section 3.3, how private coverage can be improved if contracts are conditioned to participation
in PuHI, and, in Section 3.4, how there might exist unanimous political support for full PuHI.
Section 4 focuses on the welfare implications of making PuHI voluntary, and Section 5 concludes.
3See Epple and Romano 1996, Gouveia 1997, Fernandez and Rogerson 1999, Casamatta et al. 2000, Breyer
2001, Besley and Coate 2003, and De Donder and Hindriks 2003 among others.
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2 Voluntary public health insurance cases
In 1981, Chile turned its compulsory PuHI system into a voluntary one, where dependent
workers are required to insure a minimum of their income (currently 7%), but can do so with
either public insurance through the Fondo Nacional de Salud (FONASA) or in the PHI market
through the Instituiciones de Salud Previsional (ISAPRES). The FONASA is financed both
by the social contributions of the enrollees and by general taxation. The first years following
the reform were characterized by an increase in the size of the private sector, although this
tendency was reversed after the mid-1990s. Indeed, in 2009 PuHI covered almost 79% of the
population. The scale of Chilean PuHI after 28 years demonstrates the feasibility of a voluntary,
yet redistributive, PuHI scheme.4
Another high-profile case of voluntary PuHI can be found in the health insurance programs
developed in some US states before the implementation of the Affordable Care Act. These
programs, means tested and not universal, aimed to provide low-priced insurance to uninsured
or deficiently insured individuals. Examples of such programs are the Maryland Health Insur-
ance Plan, Minnesota Care, New Jersey Health Insurance Plans, the Family Health Plus and
Healthy NY in the state of New York, Adult Basic in Pennsylvania, and Vermont Health Access
Plan.5 Despite there being important differences between the programs, for the purpose of our
analyses we stress their common features:(i) comprehensive coverage; and (ii) premiums often
increase with the enrollee’s (family) income and they do not discriminate on risk.
The features of these programs have been expanded to all states by the Affordable Care
Act (March 2010). However, a remarkable difference is that while the above state insurance
programs were voluntary, the Affordable Care Act mandates the purchase of insurance for the
majority of the population, even if individuals may choose from amongst public and private
insurance suppliers. This paper aims to illustrate a possible foundation for the emergence and
sustainability of voluntary health insurance schemes, such as the ones cited above. The reality
4Cid et al. 2008 point out the introduction in 1994 of the Universal Access with Explicit Rights Plan (AUGE
plan) as one of the reasons that have led to the latest decrease in the market share of PHI. The AUGE plan
promoted uniform health care provision among the public and the private sectors and therefore insurance choices
are not so driven by quality of care concerns. Statistics available at the Chilean Ministe´rio de Planificacio´n
webpage, accessed in June 2011: http : //www.mideplan.gob.cl/casen/Estadisticas/salud.html.
5This list is not exhaustive and aims to underline the programs most illustrative of our argument.
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of the Affordable Care Act is of a different nature, and is not captured by the model we put
forward.
3 The Setup
The economy is composed of individuals, insurance companies, and the government. Individuals
choose the level of public coverage through majority voting, whether or not to participate in
PuHI, and which (if any) PHI contract to buy. Insurance companies offer insurance contracts.
Lastly, the government sets the public premium so that the budget is balanced in expected
terms and implements the PuHI coverage elected. Each agents’ role is discussed in detail in
Section 3.
Individuals face two states of nature. They can be in good health or incur the same
health damage d, with d = 1. Individuals differ both in terms of their income and prob-
ability of incurring the health damage. There are two levels of risk {θL, θH} and two lev-
els of income {wL, wH}, with 0 < θL < θH < 1 and 1 < wL < wH < ∞.6 The set
U = {(θL, wL), (θL, wH), (θH , wL), (θH , wH)} is composed of all possible types of individuals,
being λij > 0 the share of the population of risk θi and income wj, with
∑
i
∑
j λij = 1, with
i = {L,H} and j = {L,H}.
The information structure is as follows. Individuals, insurance companies and the gov-
ernment know the distribution of types in the economy (λij), and individuals’ incomes are
verifiable.7 However individual probabilities of accident are private information, neither ob-
served by insurance companies nor the government, leading to adverse selection in the PHI
market, as shown in Section 3.3.
Individuals are risk averse, and we model their utility using Yaari 1987’s Dual Theory (DT).
For Expected Utility (EU) the attitude towards risk is modelled with a transformation of wealth
(keeping linearity in probabilities), whereas under DT it is by means of a transformation of
6As we want to focus specifically on the interactions of the public and the private sector as insurers, we
assume exogenous labor supply and abstract from the discussion the relevance of health insurance when taxation
is available. Blomqvist and Horn 1984, Rochet 1991, and Cremer and Pestieau 1996 have studied this problem
and conclude that health insurance can improve upon taxation since it does not have an associated deadweight
loss (in the absence of moral hazard) as does income taxation. Conversely, Breyer and Haufler 2000 argue in
favor of leaving income redistribution to the tax system with a view to creating efficient insurance.
7This assumption enables us to design social contributions proportional to individuals’ income and does not
bring implications to the insurance market.
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probabilities (keeping linearity in wealth). Risk aversion is represented by magnifying the
perceived risk of bad outcomes.
For analytical tractability we adopt DT instead of EU.8 Under DT the utility of an uninsured
individual with income wj, facing the loss of d = 1 with probability θi can be represented by:
V (θi, wj) = φ(θi) (wj − 1) + (1− φ(θi)) (wj)
= wj − φ(θi), (1)
where φ(θi) > θi in order to capture individuals’ risk aversion. De Donder and Hindriks 2003
define φ(θi) = (1+α)θi with 0 ≤ α ≤ (1− θH) /θH , where α denotes the degree of risk aversion,
the same for all individuals. Assuming α to be independent of w, the authors are thus able to
dissociate attitude towards risk from the marginal value of wealth, which simplifies the analysis
greatly. The utility of an individual without insurance is thus:
V (θi, wj) = wj − θi(1 + α). (2)
Individuals pay the premium pi in both states of nature, and in the bad state of nature they
receive a benefit proportional to their loss: the insurance coverage δ, with 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. PHI and
PuHI differ with respect to both coverage and premium in the terms detailed in the next section.
For the time being it should be noted that any insurance contract {pi, δ} affects individuals’
utility in the following way:
V (pi, δ; θi, wj) = wj − pi − θi(1 + α)(1− δ). (3)
While we will discuss this point in detail in Section 3.4, it can already be noted that due to
DT individuals have corner preferences with respect to δ. Finally, we use the superscript u to
distinguish PuHI {piu, δu} from a PHI contract {pi, δ}, and use the shortcut Vij(·) for V (·; θi, wj).
8It is beyond the scope of this paper to contribute to the discussion as to which theory is most suitable to
represent individuals’ preferences under uncertainty. We refer the reader to Appendix 6.1 where DT is briefly
presented. Also, it is of interest to look at Machina 2000 who test the robustness of EU exploring a non-expected
utility general analysis, and Doherty and Eeckhoudt 1995, who compare EU with DT in particular, and stress
that insurance is never a Giffen good under DT, in contrast to EU.
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4 The Timing
We next analyze the timing of decisions in four stages. In stage 1 individuals vote on the
level of public coverage δu that provides them with the highest utility (see e.g. Caplan 2007
for a departure from rationality and, in particular, the introduction of voters’ misconceptions
and irrational beliefs). They take as given the structure of social contributions which increase
with income. Implicitly we are assuming that the redistributive role of PuHI is not questioned
but that individuals have a political say on the level of public coverage. This assumption can
be justified by noting that while the level of public coverage is more often subject to political
discussion and changes, the redistributive degree of PuHI is decided at earlier stages, often
referred to as the constitutional stage, and once implemented is costly to change.9
We consider only a simple majority voting rule. We do not discuss which type of political
model best mimics the political choice of public coverage and simply focus on the political
support for a given level of PuHI. Our choice is mainly driven by the fact that under DT
individuals have corner preferences with respect to δu. Consequently our results hold for other
models of political decision as, for example, an indirect voting ruled by two parties.
Knowing the level of public coverage elected at stage 1, in stage 2 insurance companies
compete in the offering of insurance contracts. This timing assumes that the market adjusts to
the elected value of public coverage. Unlike PuHI, PHI discriminates on risk. Indeed, since an
individual’s probability of accident is private information, adverse selection arises. Therefore
the contract intended for low-risk individuals is of incomplete coverage in order to prevent high-
risk individuals from buying it (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). The novelty of our approach is
the market use of the information concerning participation in PuHI that minimizes the adverse
selection problem. We find that the market coverage of low-risk individuals does not need to
be reduced as much as when compared to the one arising under an exclusive private system.
In stage 3 individuals choose simultaneously whether or not to participate in PuHI and
which private contract to buy, knowing the level of public coverage and private contracts. These
are simultaneous decisions because contracts may be conditional on participation in PuHI. We
9For other authors using the same assumption see Gouveia 1997, Epple and Romano 1996, Casamatta et al.
2000, Breyer 2001, and De Donder and Hindriks 2003. Also of interest is the work by Cutler and Johnson 2004
which examines the factors at the origin of different degrees of redistribution across PuHI schemes.
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assume that similar individuals act as a group and take a single decision as regards participation
in PuHI and the market, given others’ optimal participation choices. Also, we assume that
type (θi, wj) individuals realize the effect of their participation on the public pool of risks and
incomes. For future reference, let the indicator pij take the value one if (θi, wj) individuals
decide to participate in PuHI, and zero otherwise. Additionally, let p = (pLL, pLH , pHL, pHH)
represent the vector of all individuals’ decisions.10
Stage 4 is a verification stage. At this stage δu elected in stage 1 and participation in PuHI,
vector p of stage 3, are observable. Therefore the government is able to charge contributions
to those participating in PuHI and thus implement the public policy. Additionally, the market
is able to sell contracts conditional on individuals’ participation in PuHI.
We adopt the equilibrium concept of subgame-perfect Nash Equilibrium. Thus, we now
solve the problem from the last stage to the first.
4.1 Stage 4: Implementation of PuHI and market contracts
We emphasize that this is simply a verification stage. PHI contracts are sold conditional on
individuals’ choices with respect to participation in PuHI, which is observable at this stage.
Additionally, the government implements the public policy. It charges social contributions paid
in both states of nature to those individuals participating in PuHI. In exchange they are entitled
to the insurance coverage δu(p) in case of health damage, as elected at stage 1.
As in most real world systems, we assume PuHI to be financed by payroll taxes (see
Casamatta et al. 2000, and De Donder and Hindriks 2003, among others). The premium
is thus proportional to individuals’ income and not related to individual risk. The public pol-
icy {piu, δu} satisfies the budget balance rule such that the social contributions equal expected
payout. The social contribution of an individual with income wj is given by:
piuj (p) =
wj
wµ|p
θµ|pδu(p), (4)
with wµ|p being the mean income of those participating in PuHI, i.e., conditional on the choices
10A group of similar individuals can be viewed as a union in which individuals sharing the same characteristics
act as a unit. Alternatively, we could assume that decisions are taken individually. Depending on the parameters
of the model, under this assumption we also expect equilibria in which all similar individuals choose the same
action. In order to support our argument, we would focus on such symmetric equilibria. This is the reason why,
for ease of understanding, that we prefer to focus from the beginning on the decision process of a unit of similar
individuals.
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of participation given by p = (pLL, pLH , pHL, pHH). For example, if p = p
1 ≡ (1, 0, 1, 1), wµ|p1
is the mean income conditional on all individuals participating in PuHI except low-risk-high-
income ones. The same applies to θµ|p. Unconditional risk and income means are denoted by,
respectively, θµ and wµ.
Besides the inherent insurance redistribution from those in the good state of nature to those
in the bad state, PuHI redistributes with respect to both income and risk. It redistributes with
respect to income because the rich pay more than the poor whereas coverage is uniform. It
redistributes with respect to risk, because social contributions do not depend on risk and high-
risk individuals receive the insurance benefit more often (θH of the times) than low-risk ones
(only θL of the times). Obviously, redistribution occurs only among participants in PuHI.
11
At previous stages, individuals anticipate the structure of social contributions as given by
(4), and that the public policy is implemented and private contracts are sold, conditional on
their decision to participate in PuHI.
4.2 Stage 3: Participation in PuHI and in the market
At stage 3 the four groups decide, simultaneously, whether or not to participate in PuHI and
the PHI market. Participating in PuHI means that they can supplement it on the market.
Opting out of PuHI means relying solely on private coverage.
The private contracts are as follows. In exchange for a premium pi, insurance companies
offer the coverage δ− δu(p)pij, where δ represents total coverage from which public coverage δu
is deducted for those individuals who benefit from it, i.e., indicator pij = 1 (otherwise pij = 0).
Given PuHI {piuj (p), δu(p)} and the private contracts {pi, δ − δu(p)pij}, the utility of a (θi, wj)
individual is:
Vij
(
piuj (p), δ
u(p), pi, δ − δu(p)pij
)
= wj − pi − piuj (p)pij − (1 + α)θi(1− δ). (5)
Following Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, the contract {pi, δ− δupij} depends on the risk type
θi. Additionally, we argue that all individuals’ choices regarding participation in PuHI, i.e.,
the whole vector p and not only pij, provide valuable information for the design of private
contracts. Competition and separating contracts imply that the contract intended to (θi, wj)
11In reality the government can use either social contributions or the benefits to balance the budget constraint.
We opted for the first possibility.
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individuals, {piij, δij − δu(p)pij}, is actuarially fair:
piij(p) = θi
(
δij(p)− δu(p)pij
)
. (6)
Hence, taking the public policy and the contracts as given, individuals choose the combination
of whether to participate in PuHI pij and the private contract {piij, δij − δu(p)pij} that delivers
them more utility and satisfies the rationality constraint (RC). They solve the problem:
max
pij ,{piij ,δij}
Vij
(
piuj (p), δ
u(p), piij(p), δij(p)− δu(p)pij
)
s.t. Vij
(
piuj (p), δ
u(p), piij(p), δij(p)− δu(p)pij
)
≥ Vij
(
piuj (p), δ
u(p), 0, 0
)
, (RC)
where piuj (p) is given by (4) and the two zeros on the RHS of the RC mean the non-purchasing
of PHI. Insurance companies anticipate this behavior at Stage 2. The maximum premium an
individual is willing to pay, the reservation premium, is defined when (RC) is binding:
wj − piij(p)− piuj (p)pij − (1 + α)θi(1− δij(p)) = wj − piuj (p)pij − (1 + α)θi(1− δu(p)pij).
The reservation premium is thus piRij(p) = (1 + α)θi
(
δij(p) − δu(p)pij
)
. The premium piRij is
the product among private coverage and (1 + α)θi, i.e., above the actuarially fair premium, as
given by (6). Hence, any risk averse individual (α > 0) is willing to buy insurance above the
actuarially fair premium.
When evaluating whether or not to participate in PuHI, a group of similar individuals
takes as given the others’ optimal choices. It incorporates the effect of its own choice on the
public premium, because it changes the pooling of incomes and risks of the population covered
by PuHI, respectively wµ|p and θµ|p in (4), and on the public coverage elected in stage 1.
Moreover, it also affects the structure of private contracts, as shown in Section 3.3. With these
assumptions in mind, we present the definition of the Nash equilibrium of groups’ simultaneous
decision regarding participation in PuHI.
Definition 1 Given δu elected at stage 1 and the private contracts {piij, δij − δupij} offered
at stage 2 with i, j = {L,H}, let p∗ = (p∗LL, p∗LH , p∗HL, p∗HH) represent the vector composed by
all groups’ choices regarding participation in PuHI. Also, let p˜ij represent the vector of the
same choices except that (θi, wj) group chooses 1 − p∗ij instead of p∗ij. The strategy profile p∗
constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the choice of whether or not to participate in PuHI if for
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every i, j ∈ {L,H}:
Vij
(
piuj (p
∗), δu(p∗), piij(p∗), δij(p∗)− δu(p∗)p∗ij
)
≥ Vij
(
piuj (p˜ij), δ
u(p˜ij), piij(p˜ij), δij(p˜ij)− δu(p˜ij)(1− p∗ij)
)
. (7)
Otherwise, group type (θi, wj) instead chooses 1− p∗ij and the Nash equilibrium is p˜ij.
Given other groups’ choices, (θi, wj) group considers participating in PuHI acknowledging that
the public policy and the private contract adjust to the vector of decisions p∗.12 Assume that
(θi, wj) group decides to participate in PuHI, i.e. p
∗
ij = 1. Therefore, it must be the case that
they are better off than if they did not participate, given other groups’ choices. Condition (7)
can be written as
wj − piij(p∗)− piuj (p∗)− (1 + α)θi(1− δij(p∗)) ≥ wj − piij(p˜ij)− (1 + α)θi(1− δij(p˜ij)),
where we can substitute piuj (p
∗), given by (4), and the actuarially fair premia piij(p∗) and piij(p˜ij)
as defined by (6). Considering the specific case of low-risk individuals, (7) is further reduced
to (8) below:
θL
θµ|p∗
(
1 + α
δLj(p
∗)− δLj(p˜Lj)
δu(p∗)
)
≥ wj
wµ|p∗
, (8)
given δLj(p
∗) and δLj(p˜Lj) defined at stage 2. In order to interpret (8) consider that individuals
are risk neutral (α = 0). They decide to participate in PuHI if their relative risk, defined as the
ratio of their own risk to the mean risk of the participants in PuHI, is higher than their relative
income, defined analogously. PuHI is thus attractive to low-risk individuals if what they lose
from risk redistribution is less than what they gain from income redistribution. However, since
individuals are risk averse (α > 0) and are affected by incomplete coverage in the PHI market,
even low-risk-high-income individuals may be willing to participate in PuHI. Indeed, besides
redistribution, the (potential) difference in total coverage arising from participating in PuHI
also plays a role in individuals’ decisions. Additionally, the greater α, the bigger this term.
As regards the decision of high-risk individuals, an analogous condition is found. Nev-
ertheless, we can already incorporate the presumption that in stage 2 the market is offering
12It is important to remember that despite the fact that risk is private information, the proportion λij , which
is the size of each group, is common knowledge. Thus, this subgame is of complete information since what
matters for the groups’ decisions is the size of each group and not the type of each individual.
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full coverage to high-risk individuals, regardless of their participation in PuHI, i.e., δHj(p
∗) =
δHj(p˜Hj) = 1 (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976 separating equilibrium). Condition (7) becomes:
θH
θµ|p∗
≥ wj
wµ|p∗
. (9)
Since they are fully insured, what matters to high-risk individuals is whether what they gain
in risk redistribution is greater than what they may lose in income redistribution. We can
already state that high-risk-low-income individuals are always willing to participate in PuHI
because they are always above the average risk and always below the average income of those
participating in PuHI.
For future reference, if instead one considers p∗ij = 0 then the analogous conditions to (8)
and (9) for low- and high-risk individuals not be willing to participate in PuHI are, respectively:
θL
θµ|p˜Lj
(
1 + α
δLj(p˜Lj)− δLj(p∗)
δu(p˜Lj)
)
≤ wj
wµ|p˜Lj
, (10)
θH
θµ|p˜Hj
≤ wj
wµ|p˜Hj
. (11)
With two risk and two income levels, and each of the four groups with two possible actions,
i.e., to participate in or to opt out of PuHI, there are then 16 combinations of groups’ decisions
as regards participation in PuHI, given δu ∈ [0, 1] elected at stage 1. Yet, not all these 16
combinations are equilibria satisfying Definition 1. For example, it is not possible to have high-
risk-low-income individuals opting out of PuHI since they always benefit from risk and income
redistribution. In other words, (11) never holds for (θH , wL) individuals. Moreover, some of the
Nash equilibria of this subgame never arise as an outcome of the game because they are not
on the equilibrium. For instance, some combinations at stage 3 would only arise for insurance
contracts that are never offered in equilibrium at stage 2. For this reason, we postpone to stage
2 the characterization of the equilibria of the subgame of stage 3. Still, one example to be used
in the following is case 1, in which low-risk-high-income individuals opt out and all the others
participate in PuHI, i.e., p∗ = p1 ≡ (1, 0, 1, 1). For future reference the necessary conditions for
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case 1 to be an equilibrium are presented. These are just the case-specific conditions (8)-(11).
θL
θµ|p1
(
1 + α
δLL(p
1)− δLL(p˜1LL)
δu(p1)
)
≥ wL
wµ|p1
, (12)
θL
θµ
(
1 + α
δLH(p˜
1
LH)− δLH(p1)
δu(p˜1LH)
)
≤ wH
wµ
, (13)
θH
θµ|p1
≥ wL
wµ|p1
, (14)
θH
θµ|p1
≥ wH
wµ|p1
. (15)
4.3 Stage 2: The market designs menus of insurance contracts
At this stage insurance companies design insurance contracts. The basic assumptions are that
the insurance market is competitive, individuals can buy at most one PHI contract and risk is
not observable.
To illustrate the role of information regarding participation in public health insurance in the
design of PHI contracts and, in particular, how it affects the coverage offered, we focus on case
1. Case 1, with p = p1 ≡ (1, 0, 1, 1), illustrates how pij is informative. Since only low-risk-high-
income individuals opt out of PuHI, the market can use this information to improve contracts.
We contrast private contracts offered in the exclusive private solution to those offered in case
1 and conclude that private coverage offered to (θL, wH) individuals is greater in case 1.
In case 1 when the market observes pij = 1 it faces the same problem as in an exclusive
private system. Indeed insurance companies are not able to distinguish types since both low-
and high-risk individuals participate in PuHI. Following Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, contracts
are designed so that θH individuals are at least as well off with the contract {piHj, δHj−δu} than
with the contract intended for (θL, wL) individuals, {piLL, δLL−δu}, conditional on participation
in PuHI. Incentive compatibility implies:
VHj
(
piuj (p
1), δu(p1), piHj(p
1), δHj(p
1)− δu(p1)
)
≥ VHj
(
piuj (p
1), δu(p1), piLL(p
1), δLL(p
1)− δu(p1)
)
. (16)
We solve the (binding) incentive problem for δLL, substituting piHj and piLL as given by (6),
imposing no distortion at the top of total coverage, i.e., δHj = 1, and noting that the public
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premium piuj , as defined by (4), is (wj/wµ|p1)θµ|p1δ
u(p1).13 This leads to the solution:
δ∗Hj(p
1) = 1 j = {L,H}, and (17)
δ∗LL(p
1) =
αθH + δ
u(p1)(θH − θL)
αθH + (θH − θL) , or equivalently, (18)
δ∗ij(p
1) =
αθH + δ
u(p1)(θH − θi)
αθH + (θH − θi) , ij = LL,HL,HH, ∀δ
u(p1) ∈ [0, 1]. (19)
Private coverage is obtained by deducting δu from total coverage δ∗ij and is offered at the
actuarially fair premium. The two private contracts offered to participants in PuHI are:
{piHj(p1), δ∗Hj(p1)− δu(p1)} intended for high-risk individuals and {piLL(p1), δ∗LL(p1)− δu(p1)}
intended for (θL, wL) individuals. These contracts satisfy the rationality constraints and are
thus actually purchased, as seen at stage 3.14 Total coverage increases in δu, private coverage is
always non-negative for δu ≤ 1, and PHI is partially crowded out by PuHI (see Eckstein et al.
1985, Cutler and Gruber 1996, De Donder and Hindriks 2003, and Gruber and Simon 2008,
among others). Also, the coverage rate is increasing in risk aversion (α) and in the risk level.
The equilibrium coverage rates (17) and (18) hold for any δu ∈ [0, 1]. It is easy to check
that (17) and (18) are also the equilibrium coverage rate of the exclusive private solution, with
δu = 0 (see Appendix 6.2). Hence, (18) with δu = 0 is the benchmark to which we shall compare
the equilibrium coverage rate offered to (θL, wH) individuals, which we analyze next.
In this respect note that opting out of PuHI in case 1 becomes a perfect signal of being a low-
risk-high-income individual, and the market can use this information. The contract intended
for (θL, wH) individuals must be incentive compatible so that all other groups prefer to partici-
pate in PuHI rather than opting out of PuHI, and to purchase the contract {piLH(p1), δLH(p1)}
intended for (θL, wH) individuals. Note how this differs from guaranteeing that high-risk indi-
viduals prefer to top up public coverage with the contract intended for them, rather than with
13It should be made clear that despite individuals being characterized by two dimensions, screening takes place
only over the probability of illness. Moreover, separation occurs with respect to total coverage, and not only
private, because it is only effective if it takes into consideration the effect of total insurance on the individual’s
utility.
14The pair of contracts {θi(δ∗ij(p∗) − δu(p∗)), δ∗ij(p∗) − δu(p∗)} is undominated by other pair of separating
contracts, in the sense that there is no other contract attractive to only one of the types inducing non-negative
profits. Yet, as Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976 have shown, a separating equilibrium does not always exist, in
which case there is no equilibrium in the competitive market. In what follows we assume that the share of
high-risk individuals is high enough so that there is no profitable pooling insurance contract attractive to both
high and low-risk individuals.
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the contract intended for (θL, wL) individuals. Or, as in an exclusive private system, from guar-
anteeing that high-risk individuals prefer the contract intended for them, rather than the one
intended for low-risk individuals. In point of fact, the contract intended for (θL, wH) individuals
must satisfy a looser incentive compatibility constraint (IC) because high-risk individuals com-
pare supplementing PuHI with relying solely on such private contract. Finally, note that given
p∗ = p1, high-risk-high-income individuals are the first high-risk group willing to opt out of
PuHI because they contribute to income redistribution, while high-risk-low-income individuals
benefit from it. In the insurance company problem, the IC (16) is replaced by:
VHH
(
piuH(p
1), δu(p1), piHH(p
1), δHH(p
1)− δu(p1)
)
≥ VHH
(
0, 0, piLH(p
1), δLH(p
1)
)
. (20)
Solving the binding IC for δLH(p
1) with piuH(p
1) given by (4), the actuarially fair premia piHH(p
1)
and piLH(p
1) given by (6), and using δ∗HH(p
1) = 1 one finds the equilibrium total coverage rate:
δ∗LH(p
1) =
αθH + δ
u(p1)θH − piuH(p1)
αθH + (θH − θL) . (21)
Thus the contract intended for (θL, wH) individuals is {piHL(p1), δ∗LH(p1)}. We can state the
increase in market efficiency resulting from a voluntary PuHI scheme in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 The PHI contract intended for low-risk-high-income individuals offers a higher
coverage in case 1, when (θL, wH) individuals opt out of PuHI, than in the exclusive PHI system.
Proof. See Appendix 6.2.
Note that the total coverage δ∗LH(p
1) can be smaller than δ∗LL(p
1). Yet it is not worthwhile for
(θL, wH) individuals to pay the price of PuHI (as they redistribute both in the income and risk
dimensions).
To summarize, if case 1 is anticipated, the market offers three contracts at an actuarially fair
premium: (i) {pi∗Hj(p1), 1− δu(p1)}, intended for high-risk individuals; (ii){pi∗LL(p1), δ∗LL(p1)−
δu(p1)}, intended for low-risk-low-income individuals; and (iii){pi∗LH(p1), δ∗LH(p1)}, intended
for low-risk-high-income individuals opting out of PuHI.
Having illustrated the increase in market coverage in case 1, we now characterize in Propo-
sition 2 all the equilibria that can emerge at the stage 2 subgame. We then provide a numerical
illustration of such equilibria.
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Proposition 2 Given δu(p) ∈ [0, 1] elected at stage 1 and the actuarially fair premium as
defined by (6), the potential equilibria that can emerge at stage 2 subgame for i, j = {L,H} are:
• The market offers the three actuarially fair contracts with premium given by (6):
– {pi∗LL(p1), δ∗LL(p1)−δu(p1)} and {pi∗Hj(p1), 1−δu(p1)}, if pij = 1, with δ∗LL(p1) given
by (18);
– {pi∗LH(p1), δ∗LH(p1)}, if pij = 0, and δ∗LH(p1) given by (21);
and the equilibrium of stage 3 is case 1 where (θL, wH) individuals opt out, i.e., p
∗ =
p1 ≡ (1, 0, 1, 1);
• The market offers the four actuarially fair contracts:
– {pi∗HL(p2), 1 − δu(p2)} and {pi∗LL(p2), δ∗LL(p2) − δu(p2)}, if pij = 1, with δ∗LL(p2) =
αθH+δ
u(p2)(θH−θL)
αθH+(θH−θL) ;
– {pi∗HH(p2), 1} and {pi∗LH(p2), δ∗LH(p2)}, if pij = 0, with δ∗LH(p2) = αθHαθH+(θH−θL) ;
and the equilibrium of stage 3 is case 2 where high income individuals opt out, i.e.,
p∗ = p2 ≡ (1, 0, 1, 0);
• The market offers the three actuarially fair contracts:
– {pi∗HL(p3), 1− δu(p3)}, if pij = 1;
– {pi∗HH(p3), 1} and {pi∗Lj(p3), δ∗Lj(p3)}, if pij = 0, with δ∗Lj(p3) = αθHαθH+(θH−θL) ;
and the equilibrium of stage 3 is case 3 where only (θL, wL) individuals participate in
PuHI, i.e., p∗ = p3 ≡ (1, 0, 0, 0);
• The market offers the two actuarially fair contracts {pi∗Lj(p4), δ∗Lj(p1) − δu(p1)} and
{pi∗Hj(p4), 1 − δu(p4)}, with δ∗LL(p4) = αθH+δ
u(p4)(θH−θL)
αθH+(θH−θL) , and the equilibrium of stage
3 is case 4 with all participating in PuHI, i.e., p∗ = p4 ≡ (1, 1, 1, 1).
Proof. See Appendix 6.3.
The parameters of the economy determine which equilibrium emerges. Table 1 summarizes the
results of a numerical illustration of Proposition 2. In this example we set θH = 0.5, wL = 1,
λLL = 0.25, λHL = 0.25, and in the table 0.34 ≤ α ≤ 1, as imposed by the upper bound
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(1 − θH)/θH . We let vary θL from 0.1 to 0.4, and wH from 1.1 to 2 with 0.1 increments; λHH
varies from 0.05 to 0.45, with 0.05 increments; α varies with 0.1 increments. Results are robust
to any value of δu(pk) ∈ [0.1, 1] and δu(p˜kij) ∈ [0.1, 1] with 0.01 increments, for k = 1, 2, 3, 4.
PHI contracts are consistent with Proposition 2.
Having all individuals participating in PuHI, case 4, arises in equilibrium if risk and income
inequality are relatively low (θL = 0.4 and wH = 1.1), so that neither high-income individuals
nor low-risk ones lose too much with redistribution. Additionally, relatively few (θH , wH)
individuals ( λHH ∈ [0.05, 0.15]) increase the likelihood of case 4. If instead the share of (θH , wH)
individuals increases (λHH ∈ [0.2, 0.25])) to the detriment of (θL, wH) individuals (λLH ∈
[0.25, 0.3]) case 1 arises in equilibrium. In fact, risk redistribution becomes too important and
therefore (θL, wH) individuals find profitable to opt out. High income individuals opting out
of PuHI, case 2, arises when income inequality becomes high (wH ≥ 1.3), so that (θL, wH)
individuals opt out, but risk inequality is fairly low (θL = 0.4), so that (θH , wH) individuals do
the same. Still, for (θL, wL) individuals it pays to redistribute risk towards (θH , wL) individuals
in exchange for additional coverage. Finally, only high-risk-low-income individuals participate
in PuHI, case 3, if neither risk (θL ≤ 0.3) nor income inequality pay for one of the other groups
to participate in PuHI.
Low risk aversion makes equilibria in which low-risk individuals participate in PuHI less
likely. For example, if α > 0.34 cases 1-4 can arise in equilibrium but when it takes the value
0.34 only cases 2-3 can arise. Note as well that for α < 0.33 (not reported on the table) only
case 3 arises in equilibrium. Finally, all the simulations undertaken suggest that the four cases
are mutually exclusive and there is an episode of no-equilibrium.
In all possible cases of Proposition 2 PuHI redistributes with respect to risk and/or income,
except in case 3. Yet, it should be noted how different case 3 is from the case in which all
individuals decide to opt out, which indeed cannot arise in equilibrium (see Appendix 6.3).
The intuition is that with no one participating in PuHI, both low-risk individuals would find it
profitable to unilaterally deviate towards participation with a view to signaling their type and
increase their market coverage. Therefore, a very important corollary that emerges from the
above proposition is that it cannot happen that all individuals decide to opt out of PuHI:
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Corollary 1 If PuHI is voluntary, there are always individuals participating in it.
4.4 Stage 1: Political equilibrium
Finally, we consider the political process. At stage 1 individuals vote for their most preferred
level of public coverage δu(p). The implemented level of public coverage is the one most voted
for, obeying a simple majority rule. As individuals vote anticipating the outcomes of subsequent
stages, their vote may change according to the equilibrium anticipated at the subgame of stage
2. For ease of presentation we focus first on case 1.
Considering case 1, we must distinguish the preferences of those participating in PuHI from
the preferences of (θL, wH) individuals who opt out. Starting with those participating in PuHI,
their preferred level of public coverage is the value δu(p1) that maximizes:
Vij
(
piuj (p
1), δu(p1), piij(p
1), δ∗ij(p
1)− δu(p1)) for ij = LL,HL,HH. (22)
Substituting piuj (p
1), the actuarially fair premium piij(p
1), and δ∗ij(p
1) given by, respectively,
(4), (6), and (19) into the indirect utility function one obtains:
wj −
(
αθH + δ
u(p1)(θH − θi)
αθH + (θH − θi) − δ
u(p1)
)
θi − wj
wµ|p1
δu(p1)θµ|p1
−(1 + α)θi
(
1− αθH + δ
u(p1)(θH − θi)
αθH + (θH − θi)
)
. (23)
Differentiating (23) with respect to δu(p1) one gets the (θi, wj) individuals’ most preferred level
for public coverage. Given that DT implies linear preferences over δu their most preferred
value is either zero or one (De Donder and Hindriks 2003). Indeed, (θi, wj) individuals vote for
δu(p1) = 1 if ∂Vij/∂δ
u(p1) > 0, i.e., if
θi
wj
(
1 + α
θH − θi
αθH + (θH − θi)
)
>
θµ|p1
wµ|p1
, ij = LL,HL,HH. (24)
Condition (24) is implied by (12), (14), and (15), necessary conditions for case 1 to be an
equilibrium. Therefore (24) is always satisfied in case 1 and (θL, wL), (θH , wL), and (θH , wH)
individuals vote for δu(p1) = 1.
As regards low-risk-high-income individuals who opt out, they vote for the value δu(p1) that
maximizes
VLH
(
0, 0, piLH(p
1), δ∗LH(p
1)
)
= wH − θLδ∗LH(p1)− (1 + α)
(
1− δ∗LH(p1)
)
,
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where δ∗LH(p
1) is given by (21). It can be checked that ∂VLH/∂δ
u(p1) > 0, as implied by (15).
Hence, (θL, wH) individuals have a strong preference for δ
u(p1) = 1. In other words, by opting
out of PuHI (θL, wH) individuals’ private coverage is increasing in PuHI coverage. Indeed,
the highest δu(p1) the loosest the IC constraint (20), since high-risk individuals have more to
lose by opting out of PuHI. Therefore (θL, wH) individuals also vote for full PuHI which is
unanimously supported when the outcome of stage 2 is that of case 1.
This result contrasts with the voting outcome under a compulsory scheme. Indeed, suppose
individuals vote over a compulsory level of δu and that the parameters of the economy are such
that (24) holds for all but (θL, wH) individuals. All would vote for δ
u = 1 except (θL, wH)
individuals, who would vote for δu = 0. Society would elect either full PuHI or, (θL, wH)
individuals would block PuHI, if in the majority. Hence, in a compulsory system, society
elects either an exclusive public system (δu = 1) or an exclusive private system (δu = 0) (De
Donder and Hindriks 2003). In contrast, if PuHI is voluntary and case 1 is anticipated, there
is unanimous support for full public coverage.
We now address the other cases. Cases 2-3 are characterized by having high risk individuals
both participating in and opting out of PuHI. Proceeding analogously as for case 1 it can
be checked that those who anticipate participating in PuHI vote for δu = 1. As for those
who opt out, they are indifferent to its level. The reason is that, on the one hand, low-risk
individuals’ market coverage is not affected by δu, given that they cannot distinguish from high-
risk individuals. On the other hand, high-risk individuals are always fully insured and thus also
they are indifferent to δu. Still, being indifferent, those opting out of PuHI will not block it
as they would under compulsoriness. Finally, it can be checked that if case 4 is anticipated
there is unanimity for δu(p1) = 1, by proceeding analogously as for case 1. Note that if the
parameters of the economy are such that the outcome of stage 2 is that of case 4, the voluntary
and compulsory PuHI schemes are equivalent and there would also be unanimity for δu(p4) = 1
if PuHI were compulsory. Proposition 3 sums up these results.
Proposition 3 Nobody is against a voluntary PuHI coverage, i.e., if PuHI is voluntary,
δu(p∗) = 1 is always elected. In particular, when only the low-risk-high-income individuals
opt out (case 1) and when all participate in PuHI (case 4), all individuals strongly prefer and
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vote for full PuHI (δu(pm) = 1, with m = 1, 4).
Some clarifications are required. First, despite the fact that the public sector is offering full
public coverage, the PHI market is active as long as some individuals opt out of PuHI (cases
1-3). Second, the preference for corner solutions instead of interior solutions and, in particular,
the fact that those participating in PuHI prefer δu(p∗) = 1, is obviously a consequence of
DT. In this respect see, for example, Meltzer and Richard 1981 or Gouveia 1997 who analyze
the preference for government programs in EU setups and whose voting equilibria result in
interior values. However, we suspect that signalization of low-risk-high-income individuals in
case 1 becoming more effective as public coverage increases is not exclusive to DT. We would
also expect it to hold under EU. Third, in our setup, while PuHI is always implemented if
voluntary, a majority can eventually block its implementation if compulsory.15 Yet perhaps
what most merits discussion are the welfare consequences of the compulsory and voluntary
schemes. We address this question in the following section.
5 Welfare Analysis
We now investigate the impact of the mandatory and voluntary schemes on each group’s welfare.
To this end we contrast the two outcomes that may arise under a mandatory scheme δu = 1
and δu = 0, with the four possible cases of a voluntary scheme.
Suppose that in a compulsory scheme there is no political support for PuHI and thus δu = 0
is elected. In this case, PuHI is politically feasible only if it is voluntary. Additionally no one
would be worse off in any of the cases that may arise under a voluntary scheme. Indeed, those
individuals relying solely on the (same) private coverage would be indifferent. The others would
be better off if they benefited from income or risk redistribution in PuHI (because of a lower
premium paid), and/or because private coverage increased (as in case 1 for (θL, wH) individuals).
Hence reforming an exclusive PHI system, i.e., a compulsory δu = 0, into a voluntary PuHI
scheme constitutes a Pareto improvement. This may serve to illustrate the emergence of the
US state voluntary programs discussed in Section 2. Proposition 4 summarizes these results.
15Note how divided the US public opinion is with regards to the introduction of a mandate to purchase
insurance for the majority of the population with the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (see for
example Blendon and Benson 2009, among other works by the same authors).
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Proposition 4 If there is no political support for a compulsory level of PuHI, transforming
it into a voluntary scheme constitutes a Pareto improvement. In particular, if the economy is
such that only the low-risk-high-income individuals opt out of PuHI (case 1), all individuals are
strictly better off under the voluntary scheme.
Consider now that the outcome under compulsoriness is instead δu = 1. This case may serve
to illustrate the Chilean reform discussed in Section 2, in which a compulsory public scheme
was reformed into a voluntary scheme. Three points should be emphasized. First, there is
obviously less redistribution in a voluntary scheme as long as some individuals opt out of
PuHI. The exception is when all participate in the voluntary PuHI (case 4) which is obviously
equivalent to a compulsory scheme. Second, if case 1 arises, it is clear that low-risk-high-
income individuals are better off and all others are worse off because they lose redistribution
from (θL, wH) individuals in both the risk and income dimensions. Third, cases 2 and 3 serve to
illustrate the fact that even those opting out of PuHI can be worse off in the voluntary scheme
rather than in the compulsory one. For instance in case 2, in which only low-income individuals
participate in PuHI, (θH , wH) individuals are worse off than in the compulsory scheme in which
they benefit from redistribution from (θL, wH) individuals. To return to the Chilean reform, it
is therefore not obvious that those opting out are better off.
6 Conclusion
We provide a foundation for the sustainability of voluntary public health insurance (PuHI)
schemes, which redistributes both in the risk and income dimensions, when the competitive
private health insurance (PHI) market is affected by adverse selection. Additionally we contrast
the welfare implications of the voluntary and compulsory schemes.
Several robustness analyses can be made. The first concerns Dual Theory (DT). The advan-
tage of DT is that we are able to isolate the low-risk individuals’ signalization mechanism, which
leads to an increase of their market coverage. However, on the other hand, DT implies corner
solutions with respect to insurance coverage. Although it may make matters more complex, it
seems worthwhile trying to model individuals’ preferences using Expected Utility (EU).
The second relates to enriching the analysis by considering other important aspects of the
health system such as moral hazard (Arrow 1963), propitious selection (Hemenway 1990) or
21
labor market effects (Buchmueller and Valletta 1996). Note that in a context of moral hazard
incomplete coverage is seen as a means of increasing efficiency. Therefore it is difficult to
estimate the implications of introducing moral hazard into the analysis.
Another obvious analytical extension is to consider a continuum of individuals. This would
simplify the empirical testing of our predictions and facilitate the calibration of the model. In
this respect, the study by Sapelli and Vial 2003 constitutes an important step in the empirical
analysis of the Chilean reform. Their work could be developed to test the prediction of Propo-
sition 1. We should find that the market menu of contracts after reform offers more coverage,
understood as higher expenditures insured, to low-risk individuals. The same test could be
done before and after the introduction of the US state voluntary health insurance programs.
Finally, voluntary solutions are of particular interest in developing countries, where tax
systems are often more deficient, compromising compulsory public schemes, and where a major
part of the (poor) population is often excluded from the market (see Pauly et al. 2006).
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7 Appendix
7.1 Dual Theory
Let wealth X be a random variable in the interval [x, x] with distribution function Ψ(x), and f a continuous
real function defined on the unit interval, with f ′ > 0. Yaari 1987 shows that the DT utility function U(X) =∫
f(1 − Ψ(x))dΨ(x) can be written as U(X) = ∫ 1
0
xf ′(1 − Ψ(x))dΨ(x). The term f ′(1 − Ψ(x)) can be seen
as weights summing up to one given to outcomes. If f is convex higher weights are given to bad outcomes.
Following De Donder and Hindriks 2003 in our setup the utility of an uninsured individual with income wj ,
facing the loss of d = 1 with probability θi can be represented by (1) in the text. Note that we follow Yaari
1987’s presentation of DT while De Donder and Hindriks 2003 present the probability transformation on the
function Ψ(x), in which case the function f must be concave in order to capture risk aversion.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
In an exclusive PHI system incentive compatibility implies satisfying the following IC constraint (instead of
(16)): wj − piHj − (1 + α)θH(1− δHj) ≥ wj − piLj − (1 + α)θH(1− δLj), j = {L,H}, and with the actuarially
fair premia piHj and piLj given by (6). Using δ
∗
Hj(p
1) = 1, solving for δLj , δ
∗
Lj =
αθH
αθH+(θH−θL) which equals (18)
with δu(p1) = 0. We now show that δ∗LH(p
1) > δ∗Lj is always satisfied if p
1 is an equilibrium. Being δ∗LH(p
1)
given by (21), δ∗LH(p
1) > δ∗Lj is simplified to
αθH+δ
u(p1)θH−piuH(p1)
αθH+(θH−θL) >
αθH
αθH+(θH−θL) . Replacing pi
u
H(p
1) as given
by (4), δ∗LH(p
1) > δ∗Lj is further simplified to
θH
θµ|p1
> wHwµ|p1
, which is implied by (15)
7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Following Definition 1, (8) and (9) must hold if low-risk and high-risk individuals respectively want to participate
in public health insurance. Instead, if they opt out, (10) and (11) respectively hold. We start by showing the
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combinations of groups’ decisions that can never arise in equilibrium, out of the 16 possible combinations. Com-
binations that are not equilibria: It can be checked that, first, (11) does not hold for (θH , wL) individuals for
the following values of p: {(0, 0, 0, 1); (0, 1, 0, 0); (1, 0, 0, 0); (0, 1, 0, 1); (1, 0, 0, 1); (1, 1, 0, 0); (1, 1, 0, 1)}. Second,
(9) does not hold for (θH , wH) individuals for p = (0, 0, 1, 1). Third, if (10) holds for (θL, wH) individuals, it must
hold as well for (θL, wL) individuals. Thus, p
∗ cannot take the values (0, 1, 1, 0) and (0, 1, 1, 1). Fourth, (10) does
not hold for both (θL, wL) and (θL, wH) individuals if p = (0, 0, 0, 0). Hence the following values of p are not equi-
libria: {(0, 0, 0, 1); (0, 1, 0, 0); (1, 0, 0, 0); (0, 1, 0, 1); (1, 0, 0, 1); (1, 1, 0, 0); (1, 1, 0, 1); (0, 0, 1, 1); (0, 1, 1, 0); (0, 1, 1, 1);
(0, 0, 0, 0)}. We now show that the remaining combinations can arise in equilibrium. Possible equilibria: Case
1, (θL, wH) opting out and all others participating in PuHI, with p
∗ = p1 ≡ (1, 0, 1, 1) is demonstrated in the
text.
Case 2, high-income individuals opting out and low-income ones participating in PuHI, with p∗ = p2 ≡
(1, 0, 1, 0). The following conditions must hold simultaneously (case-specific conditions (8)-(11)):
θL
θµ|p2
(
1 + α
δLL(p
2)− δLL(p˜2LL)
δu(p2)
)
≥ wL
wµ|p2
, (25)
θL
θµ|p˜2LH
(
1 + α
δLH(p˜
2
LH)− δLH(p2)
δu(p˜2LH)
)
≤ wH
wµ|p˜2LH
, (26)
θH
θµ|p2
≥ wL
wµ|p2
, (27)
θH
θµ|p˜2HH
≤ wH
wµ|p˜2HH
. (28)
Note that δHj(p
2) = 1. The contract {piLL, δLL}, intended for (θL, wL) individuals, is offered conditional on
participation in PuHI. Incentive compatibility implies that δLL is low enough to deter (θH , wL) individuals to
top up PuHI with δLL, and to deter (θH , wH) individuals from participating in PuHI and topping it up with
δLL. In the PHI company’s problem the IC (16) is replaced by the following ICs:
VHL
(
piuL(p
2), δu(p2), piHL(p
2), δHL(p
2)− δu(p2)
)
≥ VHL
(
piuL(p
2), δu(p2), piLL(p
2), δLL(p
2)− δu(p2)
)
, (29)
VHH
(
0, 0, piHH(p
2), δHH(p
2)
)
≥ VHH
(
piuH(p˜
2
HH), δ
u(p˜2HH), piLL(p˜
2
HH), δLL(p˜
2
HH ; θL)− δu(p˜2HH)
)
. (30)
Substituting piHL, piHH , and piLL as given by (6), imposing δHj = 1, and noting that pi
u
L and pi
u
H are defined by
(4), (29) and (30) respectively give the following upper bounds for δLL:
δLL(p
2) ≤ αθH + δ
u(p2)(θH − θL)
αθH + (θH − θL) , (31)
δLL(p
2) ≤
αθH + δ
u(p˜2HH)
(
wH
w
µ|p˜2
HH
θµ|p˜2HH − θL
)
αθH + (θH − θL) . (32)
Note that (31) is active whereas (32) is slack, for δu(p2) = δu(p˜2HH) and given (28). This is also the case as long
as δ
u(p2)
δu(p˜2HH)
≤
wH
w
µ|p˜2
HH
θ
µ|p˜2
HH
−θL
θH−θL . We anticipate that δ
u(p2) and δu(p˜2HH) defined at stage 1 satisfy this condition.
Hence, (31) is the active restriction and δ∗LL(p
2) = αθH+δ
u(p2)(θH−θL)
αθH+(θH−θL) . Analogously, the contract {piLH , δLH},
intended to (θL, wH) individuals, is offered conditional on non-participation in PuHI. The active IC constraint
is the one associated to (θH , wH) individuals: VHH
(
0, 0, piHH(p
2), δHH(p
2)
)
≥ VHH
(
0, 0, piLH(p
2), δLH(p
2)
)
,
resulting in the following equilibrium coverage rate δ∗LH(p
2) = αθHαθH+(θH−θL) .
Case 3 – (θH , wL) individuals participating in PuHI and all others opting out: p
∗ = p3 ≡ (0, 0, 1, 0).
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The following conditions must hold simultaneously:
θL
θµ|p˜3LL
(
1 + α
δLL(p˜
3
LL)− δLL(p3)
δu(p˜3LL)
)
≤ wL
wµ|p˜3LL
, (33)
θL
θµ|p˜3LH
(
1 + α
δLH(p˜
3
LH)− δLH(p3)
δu(p˜3LH)
)
≤ wH
wµ|p˜3LH
, (34)
θH
wL
≥ θH
wL
, (35)
θH
θµ|p˜3HH
≤ wH
wµ|p˜3HH
. (36)
As before, δHj(p
3) = 1. The contract intended for low-risk individual is conditional on non-participation in
PuHI. The two following IC constraints of (θH , wL) and (θH , wH) individuals respectively are:
VHL
(
piuHL(p
3), δu(p3), piHL(p
3), δHL(p
3)− δu(p3)
)
≥ VHL
(
0, 0, piLj(p˜
3), δLj(p˜
3)
)
, (37)
VHH
(
0, 0, piHH(p
3), δHH(p
3)
)
≥ VHH
(
0, 0, piLj(p
3), δLj(p
3)
)
. (38)
Proceeding analogously as for case 2 results in the equilibrium coverage rate δ∗Lj(p
3) = αθHαθH+(θH−θL) .
Case 4: All Participate in PuHI: p∗ = p4 ≡ (1, 1, 1, 1). The following conditions must hold simultaneously:
θL
θµ
(
1 + α
δLL(p
4)− δLL(p˜4LL)
δu(p4)
)
≥ wL
wµ
, (39)
θL
θµ
(
1 + α
δLH(p
4)− δLH(p˜4LH)
δu(p4)
)
≥ wH
wµ
, (40)
θH
θµ
≥ wL
wµ
, (41)
θH
θµ
≥ wH
wµ
. (42)
PHI contracts are offered conditional on participation in PuHI. Incentive compatibility implies:
VHj
(
piuj (p
1), δu(p1), piHj(p
1), δHj(p
1)− δu(p1)
)
≥ VHj
(
piuj (p
1), δu(p1), piLj(p
1), δLj(p
1)− δu(p1)
)
.(43)
Proceeding analogously we get the following equilibrium coverage rate: δ∗Lj(p
1) = αθH+δ
u(p1)(θH−θL)
αθH+(θH−θL) .
Case 5 – (θH , wH) opting out and all others participating in PuHI: p
∗ = p5 ≡ (1, 1, 1, 0). The following
conditions must hold simultaneously:
θL
θµ|p5
(
1 + α
δLL(p
5)− δLL(p˜5LL)
δu(p5)
)
≥ wL
wµ|p5
, (44)
θL
θµ|p5
(
1 + α
δLH(p
5)− δLH(p˜5LH)
δu(p5)
)
≥ wH
wµ|p5
, (45)
θH
θµ|p5
≥ wL
wµ|p5
, (46)
θH
θµ
≤ wH
wµ
. (47)
The contract intended for low-risk individuals is conditional on participation in PuHI and satisfies the following
IC constraints:
VHL
(
piuHL(p
5), δu(p5), piHL(p
5), δHL(p
5)− δu(p5)
)
≥ VHL
(
piuHL(p
5), δu(p5), piLj(p
5), δLj(p
5)
)
, (48)
VHH
(
0, 0, piHH(p
5), δHH(p
5)
)
≥ VHH
(
piuHH(p˜
5), δu(p˜5), piLj(p˜
5), δLj(p˜
5)
)
. (49)
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Proceeding analogously as for case 2 we get the following equilibrium coverage rate: δ∗Lj(p
5) = αθH+δ
u(p5)(θH−θL)
αθH+(θH−θL) .
We would expect that a sufficiently high risk aversion combined with a relatively high income inequality would
increase the likelihood of this case. Although this case looks possible from the intuitive and analytical point of
view, after different attempts we could not find any numerical illustration. This makes us suspect that there
might be some analytical aspect of the problem preventing this case from arising in equilibrium that we have,
to date, not been able to identify. For this reason case 5 is not included in Proposition 2
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Tables
Equilibrium θL wH λLH λHH
Case 1 0.4 1.1 [0.25, 0.3] 0.2-0.25
Case 2 0.4 [1.3-2] [0.3, 0.45] 0.05-0.2
Case 3
[0.1,0.2] [1.1-2] [0.25, 0.45] 0.05-0.25
0.3 [1.2-2] 0.05 0.45
0.3 [1.1-2] [0.25-0.4] 0.1-0.25
Case 4 0.4 1.1 [0.35, 0.45] 0.05-0.15
No Equilib. 0.3 1.1 0.45 0.05
Table 1: Numerical illustration of possible equilibria. In this example θH = 0.5, wL = 1, λLL = 0.25,
λHL = 0.25, and 0.34 ≤ α ≤ 1. Increments of all other variables of 0.1 except for λLH which we have applied
increments of 0.05. The share of high-risk-high-income individuals is the remaining share 1−(λLL+λLH+λHL).
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